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Utilize One in Order to Create an Effective Forest 






In the wake of ever-increasing incidences of wildfires across 
California,1 cost-effective, practical, and functional forest management has 
become a priority in order to keep California’s land and residents safe. From 
2018 to 2020, six out of ten of California’s worst fires, coined “megafires” 
by the United States Forest Service (“USFS”), have rampaged through the 
state.2 These megafires often behave in unstoppable ways. Most recently, in 
2018, they killed more than a hundred people and destroyed seventeen 
thousand homes, all while burning hundreds of thousands of acres across 
California.3 Although the end of the recent drought has brought some relief, 
record-breaking rains have created an expected, yet dangerous, growth of 
brush and grass that just adds fuel to the fire.4 
Though specific tools and techniques for wildfire forest management 
remain relatively elusive, especially given a general inability to predict brush 
fires, let alone megafires, certain forest management methods could at least 
curtail the catastrophic outcomes of such megafires.5 Prescribed burns and 
mechanical thinning, for example, remain achievable options.6 Prescribed 
burning refers to a technique in which fire experts use planned fire to restore 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2021; B.A. 
Psychology/Political Science, Syracuse University 2017. 
 1. Nicole Twilley, A Trailblazing Plan to Fight California Wildfires, NEW YORKER (Aug. 26, 
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/08/26/a-trailblazing-plan-to-fight-california-wild 
fires. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Larissa L. Yocom, Fuel Treatment Longevity 2 (Ecological Restoration Institute, Working 
Paper No. 27, 2013). 
5 - BERNSTEIN_HBLJV16_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2020  8:21 AM 
232 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 16:2 
the health of the ecosystem.7 Mechanical thinning is a separate technique, 
often used in conjunction with prescribed burning, in which extremely 
flammable or excess vegetation is removed from an ecosystem to lower the 
risk of wildfire.8 However, forest management methodology is not the 
biggest impediment to wildfire prevention. Realistically, there will never be 
an end-all-be-all solution because of the nature of wildfires. Instead, by 
focusing on what is possible, the biggest dilemma at present is the 
complicated nexus concerning the best possible methodology in the context 
of the vast amount of forested acreage with limited resources. A widespread 
and vital management system must rely on a multitude and combination of 
funding from various sources in order to work effectively. 
Most notable of which are the use of Memorandum of Understandings 
(“MOUs”)9 and Joint Powers Authorities (otherwise known as Joint Powers 
Agencies and Joint Powers Agreements (all termed “JPAs”)) across the 
affected counties. MOUs, a helpful template for future contractual 
obligations, may not provide a substantial enforcement action even if 
enforcement mechanisms are included in the memorandum due to its non-
binding characteristics.10 JPAs, on the other hand, allow broad and efficient 
power without voter approval.11 JPAs create a theoretical “blended family” 
of government functions, whereby multiple agencies and entities with 
varying interests, motivations, and cultures, create a new entity with a 
specific goal.12 In the present context, JPAs appear to provide the most 
efficient mechanisms for forestry management in the specific participating 
counties. 
Many California counties would greatly benefit from the formation of 
a JPA that implements forest management and wildfire prevention. 
Specifically, counties with expansive forest and federal land would benefit 
greatly from JPA formation. Placer, Amador, Tuolumne, El Dorado, 
 
 7. Prescribed Fire, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.usda.gov/managing-land/fire/prescribe 
ed-fire, (last visited Mar 4, 2020). 
 8. Mechanical Treatment, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.usda.gov/managing-land/fire/mec 
hanical-treatment, (last visited Mar 4, 2020). 
 9. An MOU is typically a non-binding signed agreement between parties that outlines the 
expectations and relationship of those involved. MOUs are not considered binding because of the level 
of specificity involved; the writing is usually a barebones contract that leaves a lot of information out at 
the discretion of the signing parties and would therefore leave any arising issues without a remedy or 
course of action. See generally Rita Leader, Contract or Memorandum of Understanding – The 
Differences and Uses You Should Know, Score: Houston (Mar. 7, 2017), https://houston.score.org/ 
blog/contract-or-memorandum-understanding-–-differences-and-uses-you-should-know. 
 10. Id. 
 11. TRISH CYPHER & COLIN GRINNELL, S. LOCAL GOV’T COMMITTEE, GOVERNMENTS WORKING 
TOGETHER: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO JOINT POWERS AGREEMENTS, S. 2007-2008, Sess., at 13 (Ca. 2007). 
 12. JOAN CASSMAN & JEAN SAVAREE, LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, JOINT POWERS 
AUTHORITIES: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 1 (2002). 
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Yosemite, and Mono counties, located in the Lower Sierra area of the United 
States, are potential contracting entities to the JPA given their location.13 
Other counties that have already been directly affected by large fires, such 
as Yolo, Yuba, Lake, Napa, and Mendocino counties would also likely 
benefit from an improvement in forest and land management.14 Together, 
these counties and other relevant environmental agencies binding together 
through a JPA would create a useful entity that aims to make land safer in 
the event of future wildfires. 
The main disadvantage of JPAs, however, is the difficulty in funding 
appropriately. Generally, JPAs are funded either by issuing bonds or other 
internal sources of revenue.15 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
 
The last seven years have been especially rough on California. A 
succession of warm, dry winters caused California to experience the most 
severe draught in its recorded history.16 This has caused a massive increase 
in the incidence of wildfires in addition to general economic and 
environmental stress on the farming industry.17 As it pertains to wildfires, 
climate change affects local climates by raising temperatures and creating 
much drier conditions.18 The science is simple—the hotter the temperature, 
the faster the land dries out, and the easier the vegetation is to ignite during 
wildfire season. In addition, climate change also affects the water cycles. For 
example, El Nino events that would normally play at least somewhat of a 
helpful role in decreasing already dangerous drought conditions are 
happening less often.19 Comparatively, wetter regions of forests are far less 
vulnerable because fires have a much harder time spreading quickly.20 Even 
without other contributory variables coming into play, rising temperatures 
 
 13. Telephone Interview with Christiana Darlington, General Counsel, Mendocino Air Quality 
Management District (Sept. 11, 2019). 
 14. 2017 California Wildfires, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2017), https://www.census.gov/topics/ 
preparedness/events/wildfires/2017-ca-wildfires.html. 
 15. TRISH CYPHER & COLIN GRINNELL, supra note 11, at 19. 
 16. Richard Seagar et al., Causes of the 2011-2014 California Drought, 28 J. OF CLIMATE 6997, 
6997 (2015); Jin-Ho Yoon et al., Increasing Water Cycle Extremes in California and in Relation to ENSO 
Cycle Under Global Warming, 6 NATURE COMMC’NS 1, 1-2 (Oct. 21, 2015). 
 17. Yoon, supra note 16. 
 18. Id. at 2. 
 19. Thomas Kitzberger et al., Contingent Pacific-Atlantic Ocean Influence on Multicentury 
Wildfire Synchrony Over Western North America, 102 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF 
THE U.S. 543, 543–47 (2007). 
 20. Elizabeth Hall, The Science of Wildland Fire, COMMUNICATOR’S GUIDE (last visited Feb. 22, 
2020), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20081105175208/http://www.nifc.gov/preved/commgui 
de/wildfire/fire_4.html. 
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and drier conditions via changing water cycles alone are ultimate players in 
the increase of megafires throughout California. 
Generally, weather, climate, fuel pattern, and topography are the most 
important factors driving fire activity.21 Weather and climate are particularly 
significant, which helps to explain why California has been so susceptible to 
wildfires.22 Like much of the western United States, California gets most of 
its moisture during the fall and winter seasons.23 The vegetation then dries 
out during the spring and the summer seasons.24 This is precisely why 
warmer and drier winters directly correlate to devastating wildfires.25 
Though the most influential of the factors are weather and climate, 
forest management is incredibly important in decreasing the likelihood of 
catastrophic effects resulting from wildfires. Yet, despite the multitudes of 
forest management methods (i.e. mechanical thinning, prescribed fires, etc.), 
California has yet to establish an effective widespread system for general 
wildfire and megafire prevention. It is therefore sensible to look to other 
jurisdictions, agencies, and localities to determine methods that California 
may find beneficial, such as the “best practices” method.26 Other 
jurisdictions may have developed useful, cost-effective systems to deal with 
the policy problem at hand.27 
Though this Note will not determine which forest management is in fact 
the “best practice,” if California does decide to form a JPA for this purpose, 
it should look to other counties, states, and countries for innovations that may 
in fact work well in a JPA setup. This becomes complicated, however, due 
to the natural complexity of forest management that is attributable to the 
diverse use of land.28 For example, on one end of the spectrum, the forested 
area may be federal land without any private property or recreational 
opportunities nearby. On the other hand, forested land without absolute 
defined property rights, or with an abundance of private property and 
recreational activities, creates hazards and forest management issues that 
must be taken into account prior to determining the best fire management 
method. 
 
 21. Mario G. Pereira et al., Effects of Regional Climate Change on Rural Fires in Portugal, 57 
CLIMATE RES. 187, 187–200 (2013). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Kendra Pierre-Louis, California Emerged From Drought and Is Still Catching Fire, N.Y TIMES 
(Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/25/climate/california-fires-climate-change.html. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Seagar, supra note 16. 
 26. EUGENE BARDACH & ERIC PATASHNIK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS: THE 
EIGHTFOLD PATH TO MORE EFFECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 125 (2016).  
 27. Id. at 125–126. 
 28. Forest Service, Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, National Forest System 
Land Management Planning (U.S.D.A. 2012). 
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Types of farming and forest systems are categorized differently 
depending on what is growing, and, further, the fire regimes (which describes 
the nature of fires occurring over an extended period of time in a particular 
area) are greatly dependent on the vegetation in the surrounding area.29 For 
example, in an Ethiopian forest-livestock system where coffee, banana, and 
other perennial crops are grown, there is a cultivation shift every seven to 
eight years, which in turn threatens proper forest conservation.30 In those 
same Ethiopian forests, having external information regarding technological 
advancements in livestock and crop production creates variation in forest 
health and restoration, which, of course, can affect the fire regime.31 
Alternatively, in Idaho and Montana, where the vast forests tend to be 
Ponderosa pine and Douglas fir with many shade-tolerant trees, the USFS 
tends to favor an almost complete absence of human interference based on 
the ecological role of fire in nature.32 In the areas surrounding Lake Tahoe 
in California and Nevada, where human development and recreational 
activities are constant year-round, a more hands-on approach is necessary to 
ensure the safety of the people in the area.33 Specifically, it is no longer 
appropriate to simply put fires out when they start.34 Instead, USFS 
recognizes that in the Lake Tahoe area, preventative measures such as 
prescribed burning and detailed fuel management (taking into account the 
fuel necessary for prescribed fires as it affects the surrounding population) is 
necessary to protect the surrounding population from deviations in healthy 
water and air quality.35 
Given the nature of the wide variety of forest land and property that 
forest management JPAs would encompass, it is vital to note that there are 
potential “best practices”36 that would benefit different areas within the JPA. 
Some counties may be prone to fire given their vegetation types, while other 
counties have less fire-prone vegetation but have more human development 




 29. Nicolas Barbier, The Controversial Management of Fire in the National Forests of Idaho and 
Western Montana, 304 J. OF ALPINE RESEARCH, Apr. 2015. 
 30. Wondimagegnehu Girma & Fekadu Beyene, Institutional Challenges in Sustainable Forest 
Management: Evidence from the Gambella Regional State of Western Ethiopia, 34 J. OF SUSTAINABLE 
FORESTRY 233, 233–58 (2015). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Barbier, supra note 29, at 4. 
 33. Lake Tahoe Land Management Plan: Environmental Impact Statement, UNITED STATES DEPT. 
OF AGRIC. FOREST SERV. 105 (1981). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. BARDACH & PATASHNIK, supra note 26, at 125. 
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III. JOINT POWERS AUTHORITIES 
 
Joint Powers Authorities, or JPAs, are exercised when officials from 
various public agencies, such as state departments, counties, cities, and 
school districts, create a legal entity designed to focus on a specific project 
or common problem. The language in the state law authorizing the formation 
of JPAs explicitly allow the participating public agencies to “jointly exercise 
any power common to the contracting parties,” which includes, but is not 
limited to, “levy[ing] a fee, assessment or tax.”37 
JPAs come in all shapes, sizes, and forms, as provided by the broad 
authorizing language in the California Joint Exercise of Powers Act.38 
Although common functions of JPAs include developing projects regarding 
groundwater management, sports stadium construction, and regional 
transportation projects, the language itself authorizes JPA formation to make 
any public capital improvement.39 In fact, section 6502 of the California 
Government Code explicitly gives the Resource Conservation Energy JPA 
authority to produce biogas and electricity from animal and agricultural 
waste.40 The Resource Conservation Energy JPA shows how expansive a 
JPA power can be: it is allowed to undertake projects both in its own 
jurisdictions and outside of its jurisdiction in multiple other counties.41 This 
is precisely one of the functions that a forest management JPA should use its 
power to emulate. Creating “feedstock” contracts, where the accumulation 
of agricultural waste is converted into biofuels, bioproducts, and biopower 
and then sold, would be a practical use of the agriculture waste from the 
forested land.42 
In California, the public agencies entering into the entity do not need to 
be based in California (or the respective state that governs).43 Specifically, a 
group of California public agencies can form a JPA in conjunction with a 
federal public agency based in an entirely different state. A JPA formed on 
the California border in conjunction with public agencies in Nevada may be 
beneficial because it will allow for greater flexibility, expansive power, and 
generally more applicable knowledge in the execution of specific forest 
management projects. For example, a theoretical public agency in Nevada 
might have more knowledge and understanding of how an agriculture entity 
 
 37. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6502 (Deering 2019). 
 38. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6500 (Deering 2019). 
 39. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6588 (Deering 2019). 
 40. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6502.5 (Deering 2019). 
 41. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6500 (Deering 2019). 
 42. Biomass Feedstocks, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, https://www. 
energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/biomass-feedstocks, (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
 43. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6500 (Deering 2019). 
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in California could operate more smoothly.  
There are a multitude of procedural requirements needed to complete 
the JPA formation. These include, but are not limited to, filing the notice of 
agreement, filing a copy, and filing the correct amount in fees.44 Though 
these can be complicated due to the level of detail and attention required, as 
long as the procedural barriers are overcome, the JPA is a useful tool because 
of its broad power. 
The statutory language, though broad in the sense that it allows for large 
variation in JPA actions and membership, could be considered narrow in 
terms of its power. Specifically, the language maintains that the JPA must 
operate by way of the pre-existing power common to the contracting 
parties.45 This means that the agencies participating in the JPA must have a 
common interest, or a service, that is common to all. For example, in 
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. Hensler, a JPA was 
formed between Burbank, Pasadena, and Glendale, California, in order to 
operate Burbank airport.46 The JPA, in an effort to construct a taxiway 
extension and service road, used eminent domain powers to acquire the 
property needed.47 The property owner contested this by arguing that the JPA 
did not encompass this type of authority.48 The California Courts of Appeal, 
however, confirmed that each individual city had the power to use eminent 
domain to seize property and thus had the power to confer this common 
ability unto the JPA authority.’49 In San Francisco v. Boyle, a JPA project 
that aimed to treat inmates with tuberculosis more effectively was upheld 
because both agencies that had entered into the agreement, San Francisco 
and Alameda County, were given legislative authority to legislate over the 
given subjects.50 Specifically, since both agencies had the authority to 
purchase land for a new hospital, build a hospital, and acquire the proper 
equipment to run the hospital, there was no issue in relation to whether the 
JPA could do these exact duties.51 In other words, the charter of a JPA does 
not grant new powers to the legal entity; instead, the charter provides a new 
method of exercising previously established authority.52 
Although the common power prerequisite does set restrictive limits on 
creating JPAs with public agencies that are entirely unrelated in scope, the 
 
 44. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6503.8 (Deering 2019). 
 45. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6502 (Deering 2019). 
 46. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. Hensler, 83 Cal. App. 4th 556, 558 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
 47. Id. at 558–59. 
 48. Id. at 561. 
 49. Id. at 562. 
 50. San Francisco v. Boyle, 191 Cal. 172, 174 (Cal. 1923). 
 51. Id. at 184. 
 52. Oakland v. Williams, 15.Cal.2d 542, 549 (Cal. 1940) [hereinafter Williams]. 
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prerequisite is actually a helpful tool to effectuate effectiveness and 
efficiency. Public agencies that have little in common would likely 
accomplish their goals less effectively than agencies that are already aligned 
in terms of their purpose. 
This concept is emulated in a journal article that draws insights and aims 
to develop specific guidelines for the most effective local groundwater 
governance in California.53 Since groundwater is poorly understood, with 
many intricacies and nuanced strategies for upkeep and implementation, the 
authors suggest that any local governance without sound knowledge would 
be a disservice to actual progress.54 The article concedes that in order for 
groundwater governance to be effective, there must be actual knowledge of 
the groundwater system.55 Therefore, these limits allow for agencies with 
actual knowledge to work with other knowledgeable groups, imparting 
project knowledge off of the other groups and consequentially coming up 
with better ideas, faster. 
The same standard of governance should apply to a JPA that aims to 
formulate effective forest management mechanisms. Although financially it 
may be beneficial to employ a large number of lucrative public agencies that 
can easily provide funding, the end product would take much more time and 
effort to organize their goals and intentions in a practical way than a JPA 
chartered with purpose-oriented public agencies. 
That said, the flexibility and expansive power given to the 
administration of JPAs explains why it would work well with the complex 
and difficult project at hand. The common service requirement will 
additionally be satisfied here given the nature of this particular project and 
its proposed agency and county involvement.  
Other public, goal-oriented agencies charted for a specific 
responsibility could garner a symbiotic relationship from the collaboration. 
Any environmental management, land management, or even more 
specifically, a wildfire management agency, is likely to benefit from the 
combined personnel of a group so dedicated to a specific initiative (in terms 
of ideas, collaborative plans, and even a physical work force). For example, 
the National Park Service joining a JPA could be helpful by providing 
information on its specific national park management, upkeep mechanisms, 
and benefit from partnering with counties to enable efficiency and speed in 
completion of the said management and upkeep techniques. Further, the 
common power requirement will easily be satisfied because of the general 
 
 53. See generally Michael Kiparsky et al., The Importance of Institutional Design for Distributed 
Local-Level Governance of Groundwater: The Case of California’s Sustainable Groundwater 
Management Act, 9 WATER RES. (2017). 
 54. Williams, 15.Cal.2d 542 at 755. 
 55. Kiparsky, supra note 53. 
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broad power given to California counties in regard to keeping their citizens 
safe in conjunction with the power of public forestry agencies in creating 
proper safety mechanisms. 
The amalgamation of forces would clearly benefit the greater purpose 
behind creating an effective forest management and wildfire prevention 
system. The issue remains, however, as to how exactly the project will fund 
itself. Without a proper funding plan, it is possible that agencies that would 
otherwise join the JPA will decide against it because of the unknown 
economic risks associated with involvement. Therefore, a well-planned and 
organized funding arrangement is necessary to encourage contracting 
agencies to participate in the JPA. 
 
A. JPA FUNDING 
 
JPAs are typically funded through either issuing revenue bonds or an 
internal revenue stream.56 The authority for JPAs to float bonds is supported 
by both legislation and case law. In Rider v. City of San Diego, a local 
taxpayer challenged the validity of a financing plan created in a JPA between 
the San Diego Unified Port District (“Port District”) and the city of San 
Diego.57 Together, the two entities formed a JPA with the intention of 
funding a convention center.58 Their financial agreement was complex, but, 
in essence, they arranged for the city of San Diego to pay the lease revenue 
bonds to the JPA through rental payments for the convention center.59 The 
local taxpayer argued that the JPA was just a “shell” of a government that 
exists only on paper: Both San Diego’s mayor and manager sit on the JPA 
governing board and help in the planning and construction of the convention 
center and thus, the JPA was just an extension of the city.60 Because of this, 
the city was financing a debt (the rental payments) that two thirds of San 
Diego voters did not agree to pursuant to the requirements of the city’s 
charter and the Constitution.61 The court, in its opinion approving the JPA’s 
bond issuance, stated that a JPA is not included in the California Constitution 
as a public entity that requires a two-third vote to incur any indebtedness, 
despite the inclusion of “city” on the list.62 
Rider, therefore, emphasizes that a city’s own need to gain approval 
from their voters to incur any indebtedness does not apply to a JPA that forms 
 
 56. CYPHER & GRINNELL, supra note 11. 
 57. Rider v. City of San Diego, 18 Cal. 4th 1035, 1039 (Cal. 1998) [hereinafter Rider]. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1042. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1043. 
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out of that same city. In sum, a JPA does not need to follow its contracting 
party’s obligations in regard to issuing revenue bonds to finance a project. 
The legislation is just as clear. California Government Code section 
6546 explicitly provides that a JPA “may issue revenue bonds” in order to 
“pay the cost and expenses of acquiring or constructing a project or 
conducting a program.”63 The statute goes on to list a number of projects and 
programs that are often financed through issuing revenue bonds. The list 
includes, but is not in any way limited to, the financing of parks, local streets, 
mass transit facilities, low-income housing facilities, and, most relevantly 
for the purposes of a forestry management JPA, “public improvements.”64 
Section 6547, however, makes clear that the power to issue these bonds does 
not derive from the independent contracting parties themselves.65 The law 
states that “the issuance of bonds, financing, or refinancing . . . need not 
comply with the requirements of any other state laws applicable to the 
issuance of bonds.”66 Instead, the authority to issue bonds, among other 
financing methods, is derived from governing state law that authorizes the 
agency or authority to do so.67 In other words, when exercising its power to 
float bonds, the JPA itself has the individual right, not the parties that entered 
into the JPA. 
In 1985, an amendment to the Joint Exercise of Powers Act broadened 
the statutory language even further.68 Specifically, the authority to issue 
bonds was expanded to “pay the cost of any public capital improvement,”69 
which includes major public expenditures ranging from the purchase of 
equipment for a public park to the acquisition and use of land for a public 
purpose.70 The amendment further removed obstacles that prevented bond 
“pooling,” thus allowing JPAs and other governmental entities to 
significantly reduce capital costs through consolidation of individual bond 
issues.71 The legislature, therefore, could not have made the authority to issue 




 63. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6546 (Deering 2019). 
 64. Id. 
 65. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6547 (Deering 2019). 
 66. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6547 (Deering 2019). 
 67. Rider, 18 Cal.4th at 1039. 
 68. Id. at 1053. 
 69. Id. at 1051. 
 70. Planning Implementation Tools: Capital Improvement Plan, CENTER FOR LAND USE 
EDUCATION, https://www.uwsp.edu/cnr-ap/clue/Documents/PlanImplementation/Capital_Improvement 
_Plan.pdf, (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1052. 
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B. ISSUING REVENUE BONDS ON BEHALF OF JPAS 
 
Because upfront costs are usually high for the implementation of the 
new programs, issuing revenue bonds is quite helpful due to the immediacy 
of the funding. In fact, multiple cities across California have realized the 
benefits of JPAs because of their ability to overcome the large hurdle of 
initial investments for a project.73 Lancaster, California, created a JPA solely 
for its financing abilities. Because of the high upfront costs of solar energy 
projects, Lancaster and San Jacinto utilized the financing nature of a JPA to 
equip 100% of the schools and ninety-seven percent of the municipal 
buildings with solar power.74 Likewise, Las Virgenes knew that a solar 
power system would save them two million dollars over the next twenty 
years, but understood how high the upfront costs would be. Therefore, it 
formed the Las Virgines-Triunfo JPA in order to front the costs and was 
ultimately able to dramatically lower utility bills quickly, which allowed 
them to generate actual savings on energy costs.75 This bond issuing 
authority, however, has not been without controversy. 
Many complaints have been filed against JPAs in regard to issuing 
revenue bonds—most commonly when a plaintiff believes that one or more 
of the contracting parties (often cities, counties, and towns) must follow their 
own governing legislative and jurisdictional requirements before the JPAs 
authority is triggered. However, there is substantive case law showing that 
this is not the case. 
The authority to issue revenue bonds for “any public capital 
improvement” is an established, broad power.76 
Any contentions that arise concerning the issuance of revenue bonds 
should follow the broadly recognized case law and legislation. Policy-wise, 
the Rider court recognized that due to the antiquated requirements regarding 
voter approval for indebtedness, courts should continue to broadly construe 
this language in order to encourage economic development and avoid rigid 
requirements that hinder modern urbanization.77 Any public agency that 
decides to contract into the JPA for a particular forest management project 
must still individually hew to its own legal limitations. However, based on 
the above analysis and policy implications of having broad authority, the 
proposed JPA should have no issue floating revenue bonds to fund the 
project. Any contentions that do arise will likely stem from the expansive 
 
 73. Cost Savings Through JPA-Financed Retrofits, INDEP. CITIES FINANCE AUTHORITY, 
https://www.icfauthority.org/cost-savings-through-jpa-financed-retrofits/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2019). 
 74. Rider, 18 Cal. 4th at 1039–40. 
 75. Id. 
 76. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6588 (Deering 2019). 
 77. Rider, 18 Cal. 4th at 1046. 
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geographic nature of the joint authorities. Given this expansive geographic 
nature, all contracting parties may disagree on the specific usage of the 
funding because each area may need something very different (e.g. one 
county may want more funding to go towards feedstock contracts, while 
other counties may need physical personnel to maintain forestland). 
However, these logistical components can be determined at a later point in 
the process based on expert calculations of the specific needs of each county. 
Though it is still unclear exactly which counties in California will, or 
should, be participating, such an expansive project could inevitably spark 
frustration by taxpayers and residents of these counties who are paying for 
other counties’ forest management. Especially given the nature of 
wildfires—unpredictable in both timing and devastation—one county’s 
taxpayers could pay for the forest management and emergency fire 
procedures of another county halfway across the state. Of course, plenty of 
taxpayers already feel strongly about the amount they are paying in taxes, 
and any money that is not going back into their pockets, or at the very least 
not contributing directly to their domicile of choice, can potentially cause a 
stir. This is quite potentially at the core of why other potential plaintiffs, like 
that in Rider, want to file suit: they feel strongly about their taxes going 
somewhere tangible. 
Cities, counties, towns, and school districts (the list goes on) have the 
legislative authority to issue revenue bonds for this reason. Though it is true 
that an entity’s taxes may be going to another distant county’s forest 
management and their ensuing safety, the greater goal of public funding for 
important projects should take priority over individual interests. For 
instance, JPAs are often created for proper disposal of hazardous waste. Zero 
Waste Marin, a JPA formed north of San Francisco in Marin County, aims 
to design and manage products that eliminate the volume of toxic waste and 
materials in the area.78 Though Petaluma, on the upper edge of the North Bay 
in Sonoma County, is about 5 miles north of  the Marin County line, 
Petaluma residents’ tax dollars go towards the hazardous waste removal in 
Marin. The end result, though potentially bothersome for Petaluma residents, 
allows for safer waste removal and consequentially a safer system overall. 
Based on the above analysis, it becomes clear why issuing revenue bonds is 






 78. What is Zero Waste?, ZERO WASTE MARIN, https://zerowastemarin.org/who-we-are/what-is-
zero-waste/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
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1. Issuing Revenue Bonds Specific to this Project 
 
For the JPA proposed, one way that revenue bonds could be 
incorporated into the financing structure would be to organize Good 
Neighbor Agreements (“GNAs”) with the United States Forest Service 
(“USFS”) in order to create feedstock contracts. 
GNAs are legally binding agreements that are negotiated by an industry 
(such as the forestry industry) and additional stakeholders in order to reduce 
or eliminate environmental risks to a community or population.79 GNAs 
gained popularity after the realization that private remedies, such as 
nuisance, trespass, and negligence law, were ill-suited to deal with 
environmental problems.80 Further, common law was unable to alleviate the 
burden of monitoring and policing externalities on individual and 
community action claims.81 Therefore, GNAs are nowadays generally 
viewed as helpful, faster, and more effective than litigation which does not 
allow the same flexibility to negotiate terms of an agreement.82 Luckily, 
based on the Joint Exercise of Powers Act, a JPA is allowed to enter into 
agreements with other public agencies in order to furnish other services, 
provide materials, or perform work.83 California Government Code section 
6503.1 even explicitly allows for tax revenues of a county to be allocated for 
the purpose of fire protection, as long as the funds are appropriated for those 
“fire protection purposes.”84 This would work perfectly here because the 
bond funds would go directly back to the feedstock contract formation and 
execution. 
Though prescribed burns are a helpful tool in wildfire prevention and 
management, some land makes it difficult to safely make use of the 
prescribed burning method.85 In these cases, the USFS makes use of 
mechanical treatment: reducing the dangerous levels of vegetation that have 
built up in the fires either by thinning, pruning, or piling of brush and 
deadwood in order to make the area better able to withstand fire.86 This 
process, though, can be extremely time consuming and require a lot of 
personnel given the sheer amount of acreage covered for this particular 
 
 79. Thalia Gonzalez & Giovanni Saarman, Regulating Pollutants, Negative Externalities, and 
Good Neighbor Agreements: Who Bears the Burden of Protecting Communities, 41 ECOLOGY L. Q. 37, 
40 (2015). 
 80. Id. at 51. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6514.5 (Deering 2019). 
 84. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6503.1 (Deering 2019). 
 85. Mechanical Treatment, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.usda.gov/managing-land/fire 
/mechanical-treatment, (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
 86. Id. 
5 - BERNSTEIN_HBLJV16_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2020  8:21 AM 
244 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 16:2 
project. Additionally, though some of the tools used for this maintenance are 
simply rakes and chainsaws, some of the hardier work requires heavy 
machinery such as bulldozers and woodchippers which require trained 
workers.87 Plainly, a project of this magnitude would need to have many 
highly trained individuals working to accomplish the forest management 
objectives. The USFS, generally, has their own methodology and workforce 
to accomplish their own goal of fire safety.88 
For the purposes of this JPA, the very materials that pose a fire risk can 
be transformed into a revenue stream to finance fire prevention efforts 
through the use of feedstock contracts. A potential partner in this would be 
the USFS, which has its own mission to ensure the safety of the public. 
“Feedstock” contracts with the USFS are therefore a feasible revenue source. 
Feedstocks are an accumulation of biomass, plants, and plant-based 
materials that are not used for food, but instead are converted into biofuels, 
bioproducts, and biopower.89 Feedstocks are beneficial because of their 
renewable and environmentally friendly nature: The biofuel, bioproducts, 
and biopower are transformed entirely from renewably carbon sources 
expand biomass resource potential.90 
In order to create revenue, and under the terms of a GNA, the USFS 
would have to receive funding from the JPA (from the revenue bonds) to 
collect the biomass across all of the national parks and forests in California 
(or any that were particularly decided upon in the language of the JPA). That 
way, no extra training for use of machinery would be necessary, and 
meticulous, seasoned professionals would do the necessary work, ultimately 
eliminating extra costs in hiring and training additional staff for more 
expansive work. The immediately available funding from the JPAs (from the 
issued revenue bonds) would assure that the trained workers are paid in 
accordance with their employment contracts and would continue to complete 
the work in a timely manner. In contrast, emergency work pay can result in 
late payments to workers and can discourage field workers from agreeing to 
extra time and shifts, thus resulting in the need to hire and train additional 
staff.91 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Improving forest conditions remains an important goal of the USFS. Specifically, restoring and 
maintaining land at risk of fire and effectuating safe and risk-based wildfire response is vital to the 
organization; see generally Fire Management Today: September 2019, Vol. 77, No. 3, U.S. DEPT. OF 
AGRIC., https://www.fs.usda.gov/sites/default/files/fire-management-today/Fire_Mngt_v77_3%205 
08.pdf, (last visited Mar. 10, 2020). 
 89. Biomass Feedstocks, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, https://www. 
energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/biomass-feedstocks, (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Improving Performance: A Review of Pay-For-Performance Systems in the Federal 
Government: Hearing Before the Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the 
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Because several national forests and federal lands spread across the 
counties that are at risk of deadly wildfires and megafires, creating a GNA 
between the USFS and the JPA would assure that forests are receiving 
necessary mechanical treatments and generating necessary revenue for the 
JPA entity.92 
Similar to the above-mentioned issue with common law remedies to 
environmental concerns, private actions to remove the deadwood and brush 
would not be effective. A nuisance claim, for example, would be hard to 
establish because most of the land at issue is already on federal land, leaving 
the deadwood and brush removal task at the same familiar standstill because 
there is no legal remedy to get it removed. But the dead biomass still needs 
to be collected to prevent wildfires, even if it is not being sold for the 
adherence to feedstock contracts. Here, a GNA would be beneficial for all 
parties involved. The prevention of environmental risks, a main objective 
behind GNAs, would be enhanced by eliminating the environmental risks of 
allowing deadwood and dangerous brush to pile up during fire seasons.  
Thereafter, the USFS could sell the feedstocks to companies and 
agencies that could then convert them into the bioenergy, thus creating 
tangible revenue. Not only are feedstock contracts useful to the environment 
more generally due to their utilization and creation of renewable resources 
to power heavy machinery, but also because this process will simultaneously 
contribute to the clearing of the forest and consequent wildfire prevention. 
Both of these incentives working in conjunction will ideally generate a 
stronger forest management system that helps to sustain forests. 
Creating feedstock contracts with land management agencies may be 
beneficial for creating revenue streams from the acquired revenue bonds. 
However, this method is not the only potential revenue-inducing idea. One 
example comes in the wake of the 2017 California fire season. Researchers 
in Santa Cruz began to recognize that the USFS has an affinity for the large 
trees in the forest.93 Instead, centralizing the industry around smaller, more 
dispensable trees could be a new method in using renewable resources to 
generate revenue.94 In Europe, smaller trees and their lumber are often used 
to engineer a product called “cross-laminated lumber,” which can be used in 
the construction of multistory buildings.95 Alternatively, much more 
 
District of Columbia Subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
110th Cong. (2008) (statement of John Gage, President, American Federation of Government 
Employees). 
 92. Interactive Visitor Map, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/ivm/, (last visited Feb. 22, 
2020). 
 93. Twilley, supra note 1. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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specific, smaller-scale projects could also be a part of the JPA financing plan. 
For example, one idea is to burn waste wood and brush in order to heat 
greenhouse-aquaculture operations to fund his fertilizer business.96 
Again, the mentioned mechanisms for creating a revenue stream are 
nonexhaustive. There are a number of ideas that would be beneficial to 
explore further in this context. The JPA could explore a variety of 
ecofriendly and innovative ideas that aim to rid land of fire fuel in exchange 
for revenue. In fact, because the JPA can enter into agreements with public 
agencies as it sees fit,97 it could enter into multiple agreements at once. For 
example, one focus area could be the clearance of deadwood on private 
property that does not fall under the federal land umbrella but nevertheless 
may need help with clearing. Feedstock contracts with the USFS, 
meanwhile, could simultaneously continue to focus on expansive federal 
forest land.  
There is no state or JPA regulatory legislation that keeps JPAs from 
having a variety of funding from the issuance of bonds and other internal 
revenue streams. Therefore, this JPA should make use of the revenue bonds 
to fund not only feedstock contracts with the USFS, but other agreements 
and systems that promote forest safety and generate revenue simultaneously.  
 
C. TAX-INCREMENT FINANCING 
 
Tax increment financing (“TIF”), or a tax that emulates this system, 
would be a helpful financing tool used within the proposed JPA system in 
order to finance the entire project. TIF is a taxing system aimed at promoting 
economic development in certain areas.98 More specifically, TIF provides 
tax-base neutral funding for blighted or potentially blighted areas within a 
given municipal area.99 TIF has been a helpful tool to raise property values, 
revitalize economic activity, and even promote the aesthetic appeal of 
communities. The imperfection in its application, however, is important to 
recognize if implemented here.100 
 
1. History and Background of Tax-Increment Financing 
 
TIF gained widespread popularity in the early 1970s, though it was used 
as early as the 1950s when the federal government was an active player in 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6502 (Deering 2019). 
 98. Richard Wagner, Tax Increment Financing: History, Basics, Issues, and Evolution, 20 J. OF 
APPLIED BUS. & ECON. 95, 95 (2018). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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urban communities.101 Indeed, the Great Depression contributed to the 
beginning of TIF in practice.102 
As the inadequacy and unaffordability of housing continued to be 
problematic in the 1920s, the government sought to facilitate economic 
activity following the market crash in 1929, which had only made the 
housing conditions worse.103 For example, government agencies, such as the 
Public Works Administration (“PWA”), which goals included hunkering 
down on substandard housing standards and creating housing projects, were 
created with the intention to facilitate said economic activity.104 The PWA 
was authorized to perform certain activities, such as engaging in construction 
and rehabilitation of low-rent housing.105 This government agency was 
paramount to the development of the TIF system, as this was the first time 
the federal government used private housing investments to serve a greater 
public purpose (though no actual bonds were issued at the time, this is where 
the idea sprung).106 As the depression era ended, the intentions of the 
government authorities began to shift as a reflection on the changing political 
climate.107 Instead of continuing to focus on urban poverty and slums, 
amendments were made in the TIF to include more generic economic issues, 
hence where TIF started to flourish in other areas and industries.108 
Redevelopment agencies (“RDAs”) authorized by the Community 
Redevelopment Act of 1945, had initially used federal funding to finance 
their urban redevelopment programs.109 Seven years later, Proposition 18110 
authorized the RDAs to utilize TIF.111 After authorization, the sponsoring 
agency selected an area where TIF would occur, assessed the value of the 
property within that general area, and then those values froze until the 
specific project was completed.112 During the frozen period, the government 
collected and distributed the property taxes from those properties, just as they 
would without a defined area of the project.113 The tax revenues from the 
 
 101. Id. at 96–97. 
 102. Id. at 96. 
 103. Id. at 97. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Casey Blount et al., Redevelopment Agencies in California: History, Benefits, Excesses, and 
Closures (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., Working Paper No. EMAD-2014-01, 2014). 
 110. Proposition 18 was a 1952 initiative that ultimately established TIF and created flexibility for 
RDAs. Id. at 1. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Wagner, supra note 98, at 96. 
 113. Id. 
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assessed values were then used to service the TIF bonds.114 Although TIF 
increased the flexibility of agencies’ redevelopment plans, it diverted 
property tax revenue from cities and counties.115 For example, there may 
have been significant revenue as a result of a specific redevelopment agency 
utilizing TIF, but because the money was funneled into a specific channel, a 
school district, for instance, it reduced the amount of funding derived from 
taxes for other agencies.116 Therefore, when some agencies thrived because 
of TIF, it was at the expense of other agencies that did not establish TIF 
districts in a specific vicinity.117 Because of the inequity, California tried, on 
multiple occasions, to regulate TIFs in terms of tax percentage limits and 
shifting excess funding.118 In fact, In 2011, Governor Brown called for the 
dissolution of redevelopment agencies and a redistribution of property tax 
revenues through Proposition 22.119 Though contended by RDAs statewide, 
the Supreme Court of California eventually upheld the portion of the 
proposition that authorized dissolution of redevelopment agencies.120 
The destruction of redevelopment agencies slowed the progression and 
popularity of TIFs in California. JPAs were still authorized to use financing 
mechanisms that were within their prescribed legislative and judicial 
authority, however.121 This forest management JPA should thus consider the 
use of TIF and other similar financing methods, discussed below, to 
supplement the issuance of any revenue bonds. 
California Proposition 218 also significantly changed local government 
finance, which indirectly put limits on TIF systems.122 Specifically, 
Proposition 218 placed limits on fee-based structured financing.123 The 
proposition restricted property-related fees, i.e. any fee imposed as an 
“incident of property ownership.”124 This Proposition became contentious 
because sometimes fees that were indeed incident to property ownership 
were still service based, such as fee metered water usage, whereas the 
intention of the fee limitation was to disallow other common fees such as a 
flat fee on water delivery.125 Further, the proposition placed voter limits and 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Blount et al., supra note 109, at 1. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. George Lefcoe, Redevelopment in California: Its Abrupt Termination and a Texas-Inspired 
Proposal for a Fresh Start, 44 THE URBAN LAW. 767, 767–810 (2012). 
 120. Id. 
 121. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6502 (Deering 2019). 
 122. Understanding Proposition 218, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFF. (Dec. 1996), https://lao.ca.g 
ov/1996/120196_prop_218/understanding_prop218_1296.html. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.; John S. Throckmorton, What is a Property-Related Fee – An interpretation of California’s 
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other general requirements on fees and assessments.126 Unlike the 
redistributive effect of general taxes, the fee-based structure only allowed for 
the fee to exist if it is at least roughly proportional to the services returned.127 
As emphasized previously, floating bonds are within the legal capacity of 
JPAs, some of the other methods, such as the use of TIF, will need to be 
monitored closely in order to properly comply with state financing laws. 
 
2. Tax Increment Financing Applied to the JPA 
 
Though redevelopment agencies and their use of TIF is outlawed in 
California, there are other legal mechanisms to make use of TIF in beneficial, 
effective, and constitutional ways. Since TIF makes use of distinct districts 
to create revenue in those areas, this proposed JPA would immediately 
benefit if it selected a few economically tarnished areas to focus on. This has 
been done in the past. Contra Costa County, for example, created a JPA and 
utilized TIFs to construct one portion of a development at the Pleasant Hill 
portion of Bay Area Rapid Transit (“BART”).128 The TIFs were used to pay 
for various public infrastructure improvements, such as a patron parking 
garages and the physical backbone infrastructure of the BART tracks.129 
Similarly, a forestry management JPA could utilize TIFs in multiple 
cities and towns encompassed by the JPA, even if each area had a different 
local forest management motivation to do so, i.e. one county may need more 
personnel for clean-up, while another may need to focus on fire prevention 
methods. Given the expansive geographic scope of a forestry management 
JPA, it would be helpful to retain an expert in infrastructure and 
redevelopment to determine which areas would most lucratively benefit from 
a redevelopment project.130 Experts are often necessary to develop regional 
strategies, if not more specific regional financing strategies to effectuate 
successful financial practices within the JPA.131 
For example, Paradise, California is a town that could potentially 
benefit from a redevelopment project. Paradise was completely devastated 
from a wildfire, the ‘Camp Fire,’ in 2018.132 Prior to the fire, Paradise was 
home to around 26,000 people; now, just around 2,000 are left due to the 
 
Proposition 218, 48 HASTINGS L. J. 851, 1068 (1997). 
 126. See id. at 1067. 
 127. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFF., supra note 122. 
 128. SHISHIR MATHUR, INNOVATION IN PUBLIC TRANSPORT FINANCE: PROPERTY VALUE CAPTURE 
(2014). 
 129. Id. 
 130. CYPHER & GRINNELL, supra note 11. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Colleen Hagerty, The Survivors, VOX (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/ 
2019/10/16/20908291/camp-fire-wildfire-california-paradise-survivors. 
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destruction of thousands of homes and fear of future fires.133 Paradise would 
likely benefit if there was an established TIF district because the property tax 
revenues from this area could spark economic redevelopment. Building new 
profitable infrastructure through economic development is necessary for 
Paradise to overcome its own economic devastation. The creation of a TIF 
district will subsequently bring residents who left back into the Paradise area 
and a new revenue stream will be produced that contributes to the JPAs forest 
management objective. This could protect Paradise from additional 
catastrophic wildfire damage and destruction. 
Other states have TIF-based redevelopment statutes that could serve as 
a template for financing this JPA (in addition to a template for TIF legislation 
in general). In Texas, any town, city, or county, can establish a 
redevelopment project area called a Tax Increment Reinvestment Zones 
(“TIRZ”).134 TIRZ funding comes from property tax increments, sales tax 
increments, or both.135 The “blight” requirement that TIF specifically 
incorporates, however, is relaxed, and is instead replaced with the 
requirement that the area’s present condition impairs the city’s growth or 
constitutes an economic or social liability to public health, safety, morals or 
welfare.136 The city, county, or private owners who start a TIRZ have their 
own board of directors, which decentralizes redevelopment and avoids issues 
that redevelopment agencies and TIFs have previously faced.137 
The JPA could also make use of Enhanced Infrastructure Financing 
Districts (“EIFDs”).138 EIFDs spawned from redevelopment agencies but 
have become more popular due to their termination of voter approval 
requirements and potential for project expansion.139 EIFDs finance 
construction, acquisition costs, rehabilitation costs, and planning and design 
expenses.140 However, EIFDs do not pay for maintenance or routine 
operations.141 A vital component of the formation of EIFDs is the 
infrastructure financing plan, where tax increment specifications and 
projection for tax revenues from such increments must be laid out.142 EIFDs 
are given a statutory framework in California Government Code section 
 
 133. Id.  
 134. Lefcoe, supra note 119, at 788–89. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 28. 
 137. Id. at 27. 
 138. See generally Primer on California’s New Tax Increment Financing Tools, CAL. ASS’N FOR 
LOCAL ECON. DEV., 7, (2017), https://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Policy-Advocacy-Secti 
on/Hot-Issues/New-Tax-Increment-Tools/CALED-TIF-Primer-3-17-FINAL.aspx. 
 139. Id. at 8. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 10. 
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53398.50.143 A forestry management JPA should look to this Code, in 
addition to other best practices from other states, in order to determine the 
best TIF method incorporating the present issues. 
Some believe that the overall process involved in a TIF is a flexible 
funding source that avoids the bureaucratic red-tape and extreme delays 
associated with grant programs.144 Therefore, utilizing something similar to 
a TIF system, in conjunction with a multitude of grants, could alleviate the 
pressures of finding one main source of funding for the JPA. 
 
D. INDEPENDENT REVENUE STREAMS 
 
Independent revenue streams are an additional way that JPAs can 
receive funding.145 Though independent revenue streams are vital for some 
other JPAs with simple, single project-specific goals, this particular forest 
management JPA will likely need a steady stream of income throughout its 
formation and execution because of its continuous work on forested land. 
This JPA should therefore utilize multiple independent revenue streams for 
the upfront costs of the JPA creation. Specifically, the board should apply 
for Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) grants, Brownfield 
grants, and other similar grants that are awarded to applicants who meet 
certain criteria. FEMA provides grant funding for non-disaster preparedness 
in order to insure protection against and mitigate high-consequence 
emergencies.146 FEMA also grants Staffing for Adequate Fire & Emergency 
Response funding (“SAFER”) to effectively fund fire departments and 
volunteer firefighter organizations, both which are vital to forest fires and 
management.147 Also, Brownfield grants grant funding to property that might 
be compromised due to the presence of or potential hazardous substances or 
materials.148 In this case, remnants and contaminants directly from previous 
wildfires. Grants such as these would be efficacious and relevant to the 
proposed JPA given the nature of the ultimate intended actions: disaster 
preparedness, economic development in blighted areas (due to fire), and 
emergency relief, all which would benefit from grants as an independent 
revenue stream to upkeep the efficacy of the programs. 
 
 143. Id. at 8. 
 144. Wagner, supra note 98. 
 145. CYPHER & GRINNELL, supra note 11, at 19. 
 146. Grants, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/grants (last modified Feb. 
18, 2020). 
 147.  Staffing for Adequate Fire & Emergency Response Grants, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. 
AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/staffing-adequate-fire-emergency-response-grants (last modified Dec. 
18, 2019). 
 148. Overview of EPA’s Brownfields Program, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/brownfields/overview-epas-brownfields-program. 
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Private donations are also helpful in funding JPAs, though they are 
much harder to aggregate in an effective way unless there are a multitude of 
large donors.149 Regardless, there are hundreds of local, state, and 
government grant programs and donation prospects that would greatly 




Many California counties susceptible to devastating wildfires would 
benefit from the formation of a JPA to implement forest management 
strategies and wildfire prevention methods quickly and effectively. 
Specifically, counties with expansive forest and federal land (Placer, 
Amador, Tuolumne, etc.) would benefit greatly from JPA formation. 
Issuing revenue bonds to upfront cost and creating feedstock contracts 
with land management agencies is a feasible stream of revenue. This would 
fund the JPA wildfire prevention strategy and prevention at the onset. Using 
these sources of revenue, the JPA would be able to fund a variety of wildfire 
prevention and land management initiatives in different counties depending 
on their specific characteristics and needs, ultimately creating a far-reaching, 
need-specific, and helpful forest and land management JPA.  
Issuing revenue bonds will ideally create revenue through the feedstock 
contracts, but it is likely that this revenue will only be attainable in national 
forests and on federal land because of the GNAs breadth. Because of this, 
any TIF initiative should take place after any revenue bonds are issued. This 
includes any alternate form of TIF that the JPA intends to replicate, such as 
EIFDs or TIRZ. That way, there will be available funding for any expert 
personnel needed to establish precisely where a TIF district (or the 
equivalent) should be established. 
By first establishing revenue through revenue bonds and subsequently 
through feedstock contracts from federal lands and forests and then 
developing TIF districts in areas that display a need for economic 
revitalization, this system will allow for the build-up of accessible funds for 
land that is not federal land, but instead private property that would not be 
subject to GNAs. In other words, planning to first issue revenue bonds for 
feedstock contracts will allow revenue to pile up. Then, the revenue can be 
put towards figuring out a more substantial plan for other private, non-federal 
land to implement other fire safety mechanisms. This is important because 
the vast amount of land covered by this JPA is not necessarily federal land 
yet needs to be protected from wildfire just as thoroughly. 
Any revenue received through bonds should also be supplemented 
 
 149. Cf. CYPHER & GRINNELL, supra note 11, at 17. 
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through grants and private donations. Grants and private donations can 
constitute a substantial amount of funding but require more upfront work at 
the expense of the JPA board and any experts retained. As soon as a JPA 
secures funding from a grant, the money is immediately available and can be 
put to use quickly. Together, issued bonds and other independent revenue 
streams will allow for the successful formation of a California JPA intended 




There is still much to determine when it comes to the details and 
formation of a forestry management JPA. Regardless, a JPA would be highly 
beneficial in the execution of effective wildfire prevention. The nature of 
wildfires will always be unpredictable to a certain extent, but creating a JPA 
with numerous counties, local, and governmental agencies will, at the very 
least, alleviate the financial and practical concerns (i.e. widespread support 
and physical personnel) regarding forest management. The vast amount of 
land that will be encompassed in the JPA that is proposed in this Note will 
create innumerable options for how and when to generate revenue. Feedstock 
contracts, notably, will be a great option for environmentally friendly 
revenue. Therefore, once the procedural requirements such as notices of 
agreement and fee agreements are settled and upfront costs are secured, a 
forestry management JPA can begin to make California’s forests, and all of 
its inhabitants, safer from future catastrophic wildfires and megafires. 
 
